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ABSTRACT 
The rise of software and software licensing has led to another 
phenomenon: the attempted enforcement of software licenses 
through copyright law.  Over the last fifteen years, content creators 
have begun to bring copyright suits against licensees, arguing that 
violation of license terms withdraws the permission needed to run 
the software, turning the use of the software into copyright 
infringement.  Not surprisingly, courts have rejected this argument, 
and both the Ninth Circuit, in MDY v. Blizzard, and the Second 
Circuit, in Krause v. Titleserv, have developed new legal rules to 
prevent copyright enforcement of contract terms.  This iBrief 
explores software licensing in detail, analyzes the courts’ 
responses, and concludes that the Ninth Circuit’s approach to 
copyright enforcement of license terms is preferable to the Second 
Circuit’s approach because it is supported by legislative history, 
more straightforward, and more likely to prevent future content 
creators from enforcing their licenses through contract. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 In February 2007, Blizzard, the owner of a popular on-line game 
called World of Warcraft (WoW), sued MDY Industries for contributory 
and vicarious copyright infringement.2  Unlike defendants of other 
secondary copyright suits, MDY was involved in neither peer-to-peer 
distribution nor the production of unauthorized Blizzard content.  Instead, 
Blizzard sued MDY for producing Glider, a program that automatically 
played the early levels of WoW for purchasing players and was therefore 
considered cheating by Blizzard.3 
                                                      
1 J.D. candidate, 2012, Duke University School of Law.  B.A., 2009, University 
of Pennsylvania.  I would like to thank Professor Jenkins for all her advice and 
guidance throughout the process of writing this piece. 
2 MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 937 (9th Cir. 2010).  
Blizzard’s suit was actually a counterclaim; MDY originally sued for a 
declaration that Glider did not infringe Blizzard’s copyrights.  Id. 
3 Id. at 935–36. 
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¶2 How did the use of Glider violate Blizzard’s copyright?  Blizzard 
argued that it violated WoW’s software license,4 which prohibited cheating.  
As a result, users of Glider no longer had Blizzard’s permission to make 
copies of WoW’s software and code.  Because WoW, like most computer 
programs, creates copies of itself in the user’s computer when it runs,5 
Blizzard’s withdrawal of permission turned the mere use of WoW into a 
copyright violation.  In sum, Blizzard argued that the violation of a contract 
term about gaming behavior (namely, cheating), with no relation to 
copyright, created a copyright violation because software copies itself when 
it runs. 
¶3 Blizzard was not the first plaintiff to make this argument.  In 
Krause v. Titleserv, a disgruntled ex-employee contractually prohibited his 
employer from making any changes to his software.6  The employer 
eventually did make small changes along with copies necessary to run the 
programs.7  The ex-employee then sued his old employer for copyright 
violations due to the employer’s copying and modifications.8 
¶4 Courts have responded to prevent rightsholders from enforcing their 
non-copyright license terms through copyright.  The Second Circuit did so 
by “sensibly consider[ing] [a licensee] the owner” of his software copies, 
bringing his creation of incidental copies within the safe harbor of 17 
U.S.C. § 117(a).9  The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, categorized the 
same individuals as licensees,10 but limited copyright enforcement to where 
there is a nexus between contract terms and copyright.11 
¶5 The issue of whether, and to what extent, copyright holders should 
be allowed to sue under copyright law due to license violations is not likely 
to remain rare.  This problem will only expand as software use and licensing 
continue to develop, and it is important to analyze and understand the two 
circuits’ approaches.  Overall, the Ninth Circuit’s test is vastly preferable 
                                                      
4 In general, a license is less than full ownership and grants “[a] permission . . . 
to commit some act that would otherwise be unlawful.”  License Definition, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).  The kinds of permissions and types 
of licenses can vary widely.  See id. 
5 MDY Indus., LLC, 629 F.3d at 938.  This automatic play is “cheating” both 
because it allows purchasing players to advance without having to put time into 
the game and because players using Glider disrupt real players’ play.  Id. at 935–
36. 
6 Krause v. Titleserv, 402 F.3d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 2005). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 124. 
10 See infra ¶311. 
11 MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 941 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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because it is more supported by the legislature, is clearer, and it better 
prevents copyright holders from enforcing their licenses through contract. 
I. SOFTWARE LICENSING 
¶6 Before examining the Ninth and Second Circuits’ tests in more 
detail, it is important to develop a preliminary understanding of software 
licenses—how they work, why and how they are used, how they are limited, 
and what future problems may arise from their use. 
A. How Licensors Try To Enforce Their Non-Copyright License 
Terms Through Copyright 
¶7 Two unique features of software, one functional and one legal, 
create the potential for rightsholders to enforce their licenses through 
copyright law.  Functionally, running software creates a temporary copy of 
the program in the computer’s random access memory (RAM).12  When the 
program is closed or the computer is shut down, the RAM is emptied and 
the temporary copy is deleted.13  Software is unique because it requires the 
creation of copies to be meaningfully used.14 
¶8 This creation of copies, even temporary ones, implicates copyright 
law and interacts with the second unique feature of software.  Unlike for 
other copyrighted works, a software licensee needs permission to access his 
copy of the program.  This feature is the result of legislative and judicial 
action. 
¶9 First, Congress only protected the owners of a copy of software 
from copyright infringement liability from copies made as “essential step in 
the utilization of the computer program.”15  As a result, a licensee of a copy 
of software could theoretically violate copyright simply by running a 
program if, for any reason, the use fell outside the permissions of the 
license.   
¶10 Second, courts turned this theory of copyright violation into reality 
by finding that temporary RAM copies fit within the definition of copies 
                                                      
12 Jeff Tyson, How Computer Memory Works, COMPUTER MEMORY BASICS, 
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/computer-memory1.htm (last visited Mar. 
10, 2011). 
13 Id. 
14 See Christian H. Nadan, Software Licensing In The 21st Century: Are 
Software “Licenses” Really Sales, And How Will The Software Industry 
Respond?, 32 AIPLA Q.J. 555, 562 (2004) (“[T]o use software is to make a copy 
of it.”). 
15 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2006). 
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under 17 U.S.C. § 101.16  Owners of a copyrighted program were protected 
from this holding under § 117(a), but licensees of a copyrighted program 
could be sued under copyright law for breaching a license term.  Breach of 
the license terms withdraws the copyright holder’s permission to create 
copies and turns the use of the software into a copyright violation. 
B. Why Copyright Holders Try To Use Copyright To Enforce Their 
Licenses 
¶11 Copyright holders prefer to enforce their licenses through copyright 
for three primary reasons.  First, copyright damages tend to be higher than 
contract damages.  Contract damages are “generally limited to the value of 
the actual loss caused by the breach,”17 which is often negligible.  Copyright 
violations, however, could include statutory damages up to $150,000, 
regardless of actual damages.18 
¶12 Second, copyright remedies have broader reach.  Contract claims 
are limited to the parties of the contract.  Copyright is not so limited, and 
reaches any party that violates the plaintiff’s copyright.19  
¶13 Third, and most significantly, copyright law provides for a variety 
of remedies.  Contract claims are limited to monetary damages and, 
occasionally, specific performance.20  Copyright allows “injunctive relief, 
seizure of infringing articles, and awards of costs and attorneys’ fees,” 
giving content owners effective means to deter and stop breaching actors.21 
C. How Copyright Holders Use Licenses 
¶14 Copyright holders generally use licenses in three broad ways.  First, 
they use them to establish contract terms that mimic copyright protections, 
such as a prohibition against unauthorized copying.22  This practice may be 
a holdover from the early days of software, when it was unclear whether 
software was eligible for copyright protection.23  Alternatively, content 
                                                      
16 See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 
1993) (finding that RAM copies implicated copyright). 




20 ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 93 (4th 
ed. 2007). 
21 MDY Indus., LLC, 629 F.3d at 941 n.3. 
22 Maureen A. O’Rourke, Drawing The Boundary Between Copyright And 
Contract: Copyright Preemption Of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479, 
490 (1995). 
23 See id. at 488–489 (“[I]n the earliest days of software distribution, it simply 
was not clear that software was protected by copyright law.  Thus, software 
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holders may be using these terms to put users on notice regarding the 
copyright protection of their works.24 Regardless, because the licenses 
merely duplicate copyright, there is little problem if the rightsholder uses 
copyright to enforce his contract. 
¶15 Second, copyright holders use licenses to protect their business 
interests.  Licenses can forbid actions that would devalue the copyright 
holder’s business (such as cheating in an on-line game25) and, at the same 
time, would allow the copyright holder to gain valuable information about 
the consumer,26 ensure compatibility,27 and limit liability.28  In these 
situations, the license terms have nothing to do with copyright and, 
therefore, copyright enforcement is problematic. 
¶16 Third, copyright holders use licenses to prohibit certain acts 
explicitly allowed by the Copyright Act,29 such as reverse engineering.30  
Although this is also done to protect business interests—to inhibit 
competition—this third use is distinguishable from the second in that it falls 
within fair use, a specific positive exception of the Copyright Act.31  Such 
license terms are especially problematic, and they touch upon other issues, 
such as preemption, that go beyond the scope of this paper.32 
D. Limitations to Software Licenses Terms 
¶17 Even before Krause and MDY, rightsholders were limited in their 
ability to enforce software licenses through copyright by counterclaims or 
                                                                                                                         
providers perceived a need for contracts to serve as a type of ‘private legislation’ 
of copyright-type rights in the absence of certainty that copyright protection 
extended to this new subject matter.” (citations omitted)). 
24 Id. at 490. 
25 E.g., World of Warcraft Terms of Use, BLIZZARD ENTERTAINMENT, 
http://us.blizzard.com/en-us/company/legal/wow_tou.html (last visited Mar. 10, 
2011).  
26 E.g., MICROSOFT SOFTWARE LICENSE TERMS, MICROSOFT OFFICE 2010 




27 See id. (allowing for automatic updates). 
28 Id. at 8–9. 
29 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2006). 
30 O’Rourke, supra note 22, at 490–492. 
31 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
32 For a paper that addresses the role of preemption in overriding license terms 
that prohibit fair use, see generally O’Rourke, supra note 22. 
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defense claims of copyright misuse, the unconscionability doctrine, and fair 
use.33 
¶18 The copyright misuse claim prohibits companies from leveraging 
copyright power to create a monopoly in another market.34  Unfortunately, 
this defense’s prevention of copyright enforcement of license terms is 
limited.  Copyright misuse is rooted in antitrust principles35 and simply 
would not apply to the large number of cases where rightsholders try to use 
copyright to enforce license terms that are not anti-competitive.  
Furthermore, even in the antitrust context, the counterclaim of copyright 
misuse is “weakened by the controversies and lack of doctrinal cohesion 
that plague antitrust laws in general,”36 and is “more difficult to apply than 
the doctrine of preemption.”37  Although misuse is a potentially powerful 
tool, it has limited applicability in most circumstances. 
¶19 Under the doctrine of unconscionability, a court may void a 
contract if it is “unfair or oppressive because of procedural abuses during 
contract formation or because of overreaching contractual terms, 
esp[ecially] terms that are unreasonably favorable to one party while 
precluding meaningful choice for the other party.”38  Although this doctrine 
“has proved its worth as a roving consumer protection measure, [] it has 
yielded less satisfactory and more controversial results in other settings, 
especially . . . transactions between merchants.”39  Unconscionability is also 
a state doctrine, which means that the enforceability of a particular contract 
may vary from state to state.  Egregiously unfair contracts can be struck 
down, but the limited use of the doctrine in most cases and state-to-state 
variance limit this remedy’s ability to deal with the more general problem of 
copyright enforcement of license terms. 
                                                      
33 Preemption was another potentially powerful defense, especially in fair 
use/reverse engineering cases, but “most courts and many commentators have 
rejected preemption as the appropriate doctrinal tool for addressing challenges to 
these provisions.”  Viva R. Moffat, Super-Copyright: Contracts, Preemption, 
and the Structure of Copyright Policymaking, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 45, 45 
(2007).  Further analysis of the preemption issue is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
34 Jennifer R. Knight, Copyright Misuse v. Freedom Of Contract: And The 
Winner Is, 73 TENN. L. REV. 237, 240 (2006). 
35 J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual 
Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom Of Contract With Public Good Uses Of 
Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875, 922 (1999). 
36 Id. at 924.  One of these problems is the current circuit split over whether 
copyright misuse itself is a valid defense.  Knight, supra note 34, at 266. 
37 Reichman & Franklin, supra note 35, at 922–23. 
38 Unconscionability Definition, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
39 Reichman & Franklin, supra note 35, at 927–28. 
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¶20 Fair use, the “duct tape of the copyright system,”40 is an expensive 
affirmative defense41 that excuses copyright infringement in certain public 
interest cases.42  It is difficult to determine, without specific facts, whether a 
fair use defense will succeed, and the licensees in these cases face uphill 
battles—they agree to license terms and subsequently argue that it is fair use 
to violate.  This stance, coupled with the expense of the defense, would 
probably limit fair use defenses to a handful of cases clustered around 
certain public policy interests like promoting reverse engineering.43 
E. Future Problems with Licenses 
¶21 Products like garage openers44 and printers,45 into which software 
has been incorporated, are universally available and could easily be subject 
to licensing issues.  If noninfringing use of the software hinged on a license, 
and use of the physical product required use of the software, then failure to 
abide by the license at some point in the product’s life cycle (for example, 
when one purchases a generic replacement part) could make the use of the 
product an infringement of copyright.  This result seems ridiculous, but the 
scenario is only one step away from the current suits where rightsholders try 
to enforce license terms through copyright. 
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT: SENSIBLE OWNERS AND A NEXUS TO COPYRIGHT 
¶22 Circuit courts have developed new legal theories to stop licensors 
from using copyright to enforce non-copyright terms.  
¶23 One of the first cases to address this issue was Krause v. Titleserv, 
Inc.46 Krause, the author of several computer programs, got into a dispute 
with his employer, Titleserv, and forbade it from modifying the source code 
of his programs, effectively making the programs useless.47  Titleserv 
                                                      
40 JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE 
MIND 120 (2008). 
41 Fred H. Cate, The Technological Transformation of Copyright Law, 81 IOWA 
L. REV. 1395, 1457–58 (1996). 
42 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
43 See, e.g., Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(arguing that reverse engineering for the purpose of compatibility served the 
goals “the Copyright Act was intended to promote”). 
44 E.g., Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). 
45 E.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 
(6th Cir. 2004). 
46 Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2005). 
47 See id. at 121 (“Inability to modify the source code would have severely 
limited the value of those programs to Titleserv.  Many routine functions, such 
as the addition of a new customer or a change of a customer address, could be 
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modified the source code anyway, and Krause sued for copyright 
infringement because copies and derivative works were created in this 
process.48  Titleserv argued that its actions were allowed under 17 U.S.C. § 
117, and that it owned the copies of the programs it had modified because it 
paid Krause a considerable sum to develop them and had an undisputed 
right to use them indefinitely.49 
¶24 The Second Circuit resolved this dispute by clarifying the definition 
of “owner” in § 117(a).50  The court noted that the original drafted language 
for § 117(a)—“rightful possessor”—was incredibly broad, and suggested 
that Congress’s shift to “owner” was an attempt to rein in, but not 
completely restrict, the application of this clause.51  Furthermore, the 
question of whether formal title was granted would typically be a state law 
issue, and it would undermine the uniformity of copyright to construe § 
117(a) as hinging on state law.52  Finally,  
it seems anomalous for a user whose degree of ownership of a copy is 
so complete that he may lawfully use it and keep it forever, or if so 
disposed, throw it in the trash, to be nonetheless unauthorized to fix it 
when it develops a bug, or to make an archival copy as backup 
security.53 
¶25 For these reasons, the court held that § 117(a) ownership should 
hinge on “whether the party exercises sufficient incidents of ownership over 
a copy of the program to be sensibly considered the owner of the copy for 
purposes of § 117(a).”54  Here, “Titleserv’s right, for which it paid 
substantial sums, to possess and use a copy indefinitely without material 
restriction, as well as to discard or destroy it at will, gave it sufficient 
incidents of ownership to make it the owner of the copy for purposes of 
applying § 117(a).”55  Even though it had licensed the software from its 
                                                                                                                         
performed only by changing the source code.  In addition, changes were 
required to fix bugs from time to time to keep the system from crashing.”). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 122.  
50 Id. at 121–122. 
51 Id. at 122–123. 
52 Id. at 123. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 124. 
55 Id. at 124–25.  In its opinion, the court “considered” a few additional factors: 
“Titleserv paid Krause substantial consideration to develop the programs for its 
sole benefit.  Krause customized the software to serve Titleserv’s operations. 
The copies were stored on a server owned by Titleserv.  Krause never reserved 
the right to repossess the copies . . . .”  Id. at 124. 
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employee, as an owner under § 117(a), Titleserv could not be liable in 
copyright for violating non-copyright license terms.56 
¶26 The Ninth Circuit has taken a different approach.  In MDY v. 
Blizzard,57 MDY argued, like Titleserv, that the licensor’s use of the game 
was protected by § 117.58  This assertion was not accepted by the court, 
however, because the defense was effectively eliminated in an earlier Ninth 
Circuit case, Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc.59  There, the court held that a software 
transfer is a license, rather than a sale, when the license “(1) specifies that 
the user is granted a license; (2) significantly restricts the user’s ability to 
transfer the software; and (3) imposes notable use restrictions.”60   
¶27 Here, Blizzard specified that the user is granted a license, required 
transferees to transfer all original documentation and accept Blizzard’s 
license (transfer restrictions), and reserved the right terminate service if a 
player violated the terms of use (use restrictions).61  As such, Blizzard’s 
transfers were licenses, and § 117(a) did not apply.62 
¶28 Determining whether users are owners did not end the inquiry into 
whether there was direct infringement. The court noted63 that “[t]o recover 
for copyright infringement based on breach of a license agreement, (1) the 
copying must exceed the scope of the defendant’s license and (2) the 
copyright owner’s complaint must be grounded in an exclusive right of 
copyright (e.g., unlawful reproduction or distribution).”64  To prevent 
                                                      
56 17 U.S.C. § 117(a).  The court subsumed the unauthorized copies analysis into 
unauthorized modification analysis, and the rest of the opinion is devoted to 
whether Titleserv’s modifications fell under § 117(a).  Titleserv, 402 F.3d at 
125–130. 
57 MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010). 
58 Id. at 937. 
59 Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010). 
60 Id. at 1111. 
61 MDY Indus., LLC, 629 F.3d at 938–39. 
62 Id. at 939. 
63 It is unclear whether this language—or the language that follows—is dicta.  
Immediately prior to this analysis, the court held that Blizzard’s “prohibitions 
against bots and unauthorized third-party software are covenants rather than 
copyright-enforceable conditions.”  Id. at 939–40.  As covenants, their breach 
“is actionable only under contract law.”  Id. at 939.  It is hard to see how this 
does not definitively resolve the issue.  Furthermore, later in the opinion, the 
court treats the contract/covenant analysis as dispositive: “We have explained 
that [Blizzard’s] bot prohibition is a license covenant rather than a condition. 
Thus, a Glider user who violates this covenant does not infringe by continuing to 
copy code into RAM.”  Id. at 954.  As such, the court’s “nexus of copyright” 
language is probably technically dicta, but, given the amount of time the court 
spent on the issue, extremely persuasive. 
64 Id. at 940.  This is also the view espoused by Nimmer:  
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copyright holders from using copyright law to enforce their license terms, 
the court went one step further:65 “for a licensee’s violation of a contract to 
constitute copyright infringement, there must be a nexus between the 
[contract] condition and the licensor’s exclusive rights of copyright.”66 
¶29 Here, the license provision that WoW players had violated was one 
that prohibited cheating through unrelated add-on software.  The activity 
Blizzard was trying to regulate through this clause did not affect any of 
Blizzard’s copyrights under § 106, so the violation of the clause could not 
be enforced through copyright.67  As a result, there was no copyright 
infringement, and MDY was not secondarily liable.68 
                                                                                                                         
If the grantee’s violation consists of a failure to satisfy a condition to the 
grant (as distinguished from a breach of a covenant), it follows that the 
rights dependent on satisfaction of that condition have not been effectively 
granted, rendering any use by the grantee without authority from the 
grantor. The legal consequence is that the grantee’s conduct10 may 
constitute copyright infringement. 
3-10 MELVIN B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§10.15[A][2] (2010).  Furthermore, “[t]o be actionable as infringement, the 
conduct must implicate one of the copyright owner’s enumerated rights.”  Id. at 
n.10. 
65 MDYIndus., LLC, 629 F.3d at 941 (“Were we to hold otherwise, Blizzard—or 
any software copyright holder—could designate any disfavored conduct during 
software use as copyright infringement, by purporting to condition the license on 
the player’s abstention from the disfavored conduct.  The rationale would be that 
because the conduct occurs while the player’s computer is copying the software 
code into RAM in order for it to run, the violation is copyright infringement.  
This would allow software copyright owners far greater rights than Congress has 
generally conferred on copyright owners.”).  
66 Id.    
67 Id. at 941. 
68 Id. The Federal Circuit, the only other circuit to explicitly address this issue, 
has taken a slightly different approach.  Dealing first with the question of 
whether a licensee can use 17 U.S.C. § 117(a), the Federal Circuit held that a 
transfer was a license if it “imposed more severe restrictions on [the licensee’s] 
rights . . . than would be imposed on a party who owned copies of the software 
subject only to the rights of the copyright holder under the Copyright Act.”  
DSC Commc’n Corp. v. Pulse Commc’n, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 
1999).  As a result, a license that prohibited transfer and restricted the buyer 
from using the software on third-party hardware constituted a license, not a sale.  
Id. at 1360–63. However, like the Ninth Circuit, the Federal Circuit then turns to 
the two-step analysis of whether the defendant’s actions were both 1) outside the 
scope of the license and 2) within copyright.  Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom 
Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  
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III. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO APPROACHES 
¶30 Although both the Ninth and Second Circuits prevented content 
creators from enforcing their licenses through copyright, they chose 
different approaches.  The Ninth Circuit’s approach is better supported by 
the legislature, clearer, and better able to stop future content creators from 
using copyright to enforce their licenses. 
A. Legislative Support 
¶31 The statutory language and legislative history of 17 U.S.C. § 117 
strongly support the Ninth Circuit’s approach.  A buyer qualifies as an 
owner for the purposes of § 117(a) under very limited circumstances: when 
he has been granted title, or when his use or transfer of the copy is 
unrestricted.69  Conversely, the Second Circuit considers almost every 
licensee an owner.  Although the court purports to limit owners under § 
117(a) to those with the right to possess and use their software “without 
material restriction,”70 a closer examination reveals that this condition has 
little practical effect.  In Titleserv, the licensee was prohibited from 
modifying the software’s source code, which, in the court’s own language, 
“would have severely limited the value of those programs . . . .”71  If a 
limitation that prevents the licensee from doing basic, essential tasks (such 
as adding customers) in his program is not a material restriction, it is 
unclear if anything qualifies as such.72  As a result, a buyer is an owner for 
the purposes of § 117(a) when he pays for the software and has the right to 
possess and use copies of the programs forever or destroy them at will.73   
¶32 The statutory language better supports the Ninth Circuit’s approach. 
Section 117(a) protects “owners,” not “licensees.”  The Second Circuit’s 
expansive definition of “owner” practically eliminates the distinction 
between the two.  Furthermore, Congress’s use of both “owner”74 and 
“lessee”75 in the copyright statute demonstrates that it was quite capable of 
making this distinction if it wanted to do so.  The Second Circuit’s 
expansive definition of “owner” appears to be unjustified. 
                                                      
69 Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010). 
70 Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 124–25 (2d Cir. 2005).   
71 Id. at 121. 
72 Id. at 124–25. 
73 Id.  
74 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (“[I]t is not an infringement for the owner of a 
copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or 
adaptation of that computer program . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
75 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 117(c) (“[I]t is not an infringement for the owner or 
lessee of a machine to make or authorize the making of a copy of a computer 
program . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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¶33 The Second Circuit’s approach is further discredited by legislative 
history.  One point is clear: The National Commission on New 
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) drafted § 117(a) to 
protect “rightful possessors.”76  Without comment, Congress adopted almost 
all of CONTU’s suggested language—but changed “rightful possessors” to 
“owners.”77  Some commentators have suggested that this change was a 
typo,78 while the Second Circuit has argued that Congress merely wanted 
more restrictive language that would prevent “a messenger delivering a 
program, a bailee, or countless others temporarily in lawful possession of a 
copy” from taking  advantage of § 117(a).79   
¶34 It is likely that Congress did not want § 117(a)80 to be available to 
all rightful possessors, and there is no evidence that it wanted to adopt the 
Second Circuit’s approach and open § 117(a) to the largest category of 
software users—licensees.  Software licenses were common when the law 
was revised,81 and if Congress intended to limit § 117(a)’s reach yet still 
allow licensees to use it, it seems much more likely that Congress would 
have used the phrase “owners or lessee”82 as it did in § 117(c).  This choice 
is especially significant because § 117(c) was adopted after § 117(a), and 
also after the MAI case that created this potential problem.83  The fact that 
Congress could have but did not mention lessees, and instead focused on 
owners, strongly supports the Ninth Circuit’s approach. 
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B. Certainty and Ambiguity 
¶35 The Ninth Circuit’s approach provides more certainty than that of 
the Second Circuit with regard to determining whether a license term can be 
enforced through copyright.  Under the Ninth Circuit’s approach, a license 
term will be enforced through copyright if the software transfer is a license, 
rather than a sale, and if there is a nexus between the license term regulating 
an activity and copyright.84 
¶36 It is important to note that the first inquiry (whether there is a 
license or a sale) is irrelevant.  If the transfer is a sale, the buyer can only be 
sued under copyright for acts that violate the rightsholder’s copyright, such 
as permanent copying or derivative works.  If the transfer is a license, the 
licensee can only be sued under copyright for violating license terms that 
protect the rightsholder’s copyrights, such as a prohibition on creating 
permanent copies or derivative works.  Thus, a court adhering to the Ninth 
Circuit’s approach need only ask whether there is a nexus between the term 
and the content creator’s copyright.  This is a relatively straightforward 
inquiry that leaves little room for ambiguity.  It is, therefore, easy under the 
Ninth Circuit’s doctrine for rightsholders and consumers to determine 
whether a license term can be enforced through copyright.  
¶37  The Second Circuit’s test, on the other hand, is weighed down by 
ambiguous language and an uncertain standard.  Titleserv proposed that a 
transferee does not violate copyright for transitory copies of software 
programs, even if they are created without the copyright holder’s 
permission, if the transferee “exercises sufficient incidents of ownership 
over a copy of the program to be sensibly considered the owner.”85  This 
language, especially the words “sufficient” and “sensibly considered” 
provides little guidance to rightsholders and consumers to determine 
whether a particular license can be enforced through copyright. 
¶38 Furthermore, the Second Circuit’s elaboration of this test provides 
little clarification.  In Titleserv, the court initially “considers” a wide variety 
of factors in determining whether the defendants were sensibly considered 
owners—some of which would be fairly restrictive (such as Titleserv’s 
substantial expenditures to develop the software in question).86  The court’s 
final holding, however, seems to encompass a much broader set of 
circumstances (paying for the right to “use and possess” the software).87  As 
a result, it is unclear whether subsequent cases will adopt Titleserv’s broad 
or narrow interpretation, creating further ambiguity around the question of 
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when license terms can be enforced through copyright in the Second 
Circuit. 
C. Solving the Problem: Preventing Copyright Holders From 
Enforcing Contract Terms Through Copyright 
¶39 Although there is little difference between the two Circuits in their 
ability to prevent copyright holders from enforcing contract terms through 
copyright, the Ninth Circuit’s approach is still preferable because it is more 
difficult to circumvent.  
¶40 In the Second Circuit, most license holders will probably be 
considered owners for the purposes of § 117(a).88  As a result, they cannot 
be held liable in copyright for the temporary copies their software produce 
incidental to running.  They can, however, be held liable for any other 
copyright-significant act—the creation of permanent copies or derivative 
works. 
¶41 In the Ninth Circuit, most software transferees will probably be 
considered licensees, not owners.  These licensees, however, can only be 
sued in copyright for violating a license term that is tied to a copyright, such 
as the creation of permanent copies or derivative works.  They cannot be 
sued in copyright just for the temporary copies their software produce 
incidental to running, even if they lack the copyright holder’s permission.  
Under both Circuits’ approaches, then, license terms that do not protect a 
copyright cannot be enforced through copyright—in the Second Circuit, 
because licensees are considered owners, and in the Ninth Circuit, through 
judicial rulemaking. 
¶42 While these results are similar, there remains one crucial difference 
between the two approaches: the Second Circuit’s test is far easier to 
circumvent.  The Ninth Circuit, in MDY, has explicitly created a rule against 
rightsholders using copyright to enforce non-copyright terms,89 and has 
based this rule in unequivocal policy arguments that copyright should not be 
expanded by contract.90  Even if a rightsholder were somehow able to 
circumvent the exact language of MDY, a future court would be guided by 
MDY’s policy rationale to prevent that rightsholder from enforcing a 
contract term through copyright.  Titleserv has no such explanation, and the 
test that it uses—“sufficient incidents of ownership” to “be sensibly 
considered the owner”91 of a software copy—is based on technicalities that 
could be easily circumvented by an entrepreneurial rightsholder who adds 
the requirement that the software be returned after use. 
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CONCLUSION 
¶43 As software and the practice of software licensing continue to 
develop, courts will have to formulate new rules to prevent rightsholders 
from enforcing their contracts through copyright.  Two courts, the Ninth 
Circuit and the Second Circuit, have both faced this problem head on, and 
each has developed its own response.  These two responses, however, are 
not equal.  The Second Circuit tries to sidestep the heart of the issue by 
adhering to a technical definition of “owner,” and in doing so, creates a rule 
that is unsupported by the legislature, ambiguous, and easy to circumvent.  
The Ninth Circuit directly faces the question of when to enforce license 
terms through copyright by using a new rule that is easy to apply and 
difficult to avoid.  Going forward, it is important for courts to understand 
the approaches taken by these circuit courts and the merits of each, and 
ultimately to better develop their own responses to rightsholders that try to 
enforce their license terms through copyright. 
